My charge in this paper is to analyze the roles of monetary, fiscal and regulatory policies in the run-up, midst, and aftermath of the crisis. This focus directs attention to the following questions:
Financial Policies in the Run-Up to the Crisis
It has become fashionable, even commonplace, to blame outside factors for the credit crisis in the United States. Alan Greenspan has argued that the crisis had its roots in the end of the Cold War, which changed the geopolitical and economic balance (Greenspan 2010) . Others have attributed the crisis to the rise of China, which unbalanced global markets by significantly augmenting global labor supply with workers with an inordinate inclination to save (Bernanke 2010) .
While factors such as these may have played an enabling or compounding role, the root causes of the crisis, in my view, lay at home. Those root causes were an ideology of market fundamentalism and the policies flowing from it. 2 The idea that markets get it right and governments only get in the way, what I refer to here as market fundamentalism, is a powerful current in American thought. That ideology was dealt a blow by the Great Depression, which bequeathed a consensus that markets are dangerously unstable and require strong oversight. But historical memory does not last forever, and by the 1970s the generation that lived through the 1930s had begun to pass. Already before the Reagan revolution American anti-regulationist ideology had reasserted itself, and the policy pendulum had begun to swing in the other direction with the removal of Regulation Q ceilings on interest on the deposits and the elimination of regulatory restrictions on stock brokers' commissions. The Reagan Administration pushed the deregulatory envelope, albeit more in the nonfinancial than the financial sphere. In the second half of the 1990s the Clinton Administration and Greenspan Fed then rejected proposals for regulating financial derivatives. 3 This was followed after the turn of the century by Bush policies weakening oversight of the financial-services industry and limiting the resources provided the overseers.
The upshot was a situation where mortgage brokers were allowed to originate subprime mortgages in the absence of meaningful regulatory oversight. Banks were permitted to minimize costly capital cushions and raise leverage to dangerous heights. They were allowed to further economize on the need for capital by shopping for ratings on the complex derivative instruments concocted from those subprime mortgages. They were able to enhance those ratings further by wrapping the resulting securities with credit default swaps obtained from lightly regulated and poorly capitalized nonbank financial firms like the American International Group. None of this was socially-redeeming business practice, or so we now appreciate. But the temptation to engage in it was irresistible given the heads-I-win-tails-you-lose structure of executive compensation and absence of regulatory oversight.
Given their inadequate resources, it is not surprising that the Securities and Exchange
Commission and other regulators were unable to detect even blatant frauds like Harry Madoff and Kenneth Starr (the financial advisor, not the former solicitor general), much less sophisticated efforts at regulatory arbitrage like Lehman Brothers' Repo 105 transactions. 4 There is a perennial "bloodhounds and greyhounds problem" in financial markets: the highlyincented private greyhounds run very fast, and the regulatory bloodhounds attempting to stay on their trail strain to keep up. This imbalance is especially pronounced periods like the recent decade when financial structures and practices are changing rapidly. But it doesn't help to put the bloodhounds on a starvation diet.
The limited resources with which the regulators were provided encouraged them to acquiesce in the privatization of their supervisory and regulatory function. Where they had once placed bank assets into buckets according to risk and set capital requirements accordingly, they now allowed banks to rely on their own models to gauge risk and capital adequacy. Where banks lacked models, the regulators allowed them, and their customers, to use letter grades assigned to their securities by the rating agencies.
Both practices were problematic. Banks had incentives to tweak their models to limit the estimated likelihood of a significant loss on their portfolios, since this limited the capital they had to hold and elevated their profits. If it also heightened the risk of failure, well, that was someone else's problem. That their models of the returns on and covariances of complex derivative securities were estimated on short spans of data covering only periods when, inter alia, housing prices had been going up was similarly not of concern. The mathematization of riskmanagement protocols derived from finance-theoretic tools encouraged false confidence in these practices. The fact the models were based on restrictive assumptions -necessarily in order to make them tractable -was easily forgotten. That they were linear representations of an intrinsically nonlinear world was dismissed as of second-order importance.
The rating agencies were no better. Advising an originator on how to structure an instrument so as to secure an investment-grade rating and then rating the same security bred conflicts of interest. The agencies allowed themselves to be played off against one another by issuers shopping for ratings. Market participants alarmed by these practices had nowhere to turn given the entry barrier posed by the Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization status conferred by the SEC and required in order for credit ratings to be used for regulatory purposes.
After their experience in 1997-8, Asian readers will no doubt feel a sense of shadenfreude about all this scorn being heaped on the rating agencies. That grim self-satisfaction may recede, however, when they ask themselves exactly what the alternative is for issuing ratings and setting capital requirements. 
Glass-Steagall and the GSAs
At this point is necessary to say something about a set of more specialized issues, starting with the elimination of the Glass-Steagall restrictions on mixing commercial and investment banking. 6 It is fashionable to question whether the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act revoking the last vestiges of Glass-Steagall had much to do with the crisis. Gramm-Leach-Bliley was itself a response to the fact that banks had long since discovered ways around Glass-Steagall. And it was investment banks already specialized in the origination and distribution of complex securities, and not deposit-taking commercial banks freed up by the elimination of Glass-Steagall, that played the central role in originating and distributing complex mortgage-related securities, had the highest levels of leverage, and took the hardest fall.
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In fact the role of Gramm-Leach-Bliley was still significant, if somewhat subtler in its effects. Together with the regulatory arbitrage that contributed to their demise, the removal of the Glass-Steagall restrictions intensified competition between the commercial and investment bank subsectors. It allowed commercial banks with preferential access to funding courtesy of FDIC insurance on their deposits to move into activities that had traditionally been the preserve of the investment banks. 8 The latter responded by taking on more risk in the effort to maintain their historical return on capital. 9 The explosive growth of leverage and excessive reliance on short-term funding that were two weak links in the financial chain both reflected these competitive dynamics. All this suggests that while policies channeling excessive finance into affordable housing did not help, there were also a wider credit boom and more pervasive incentive problems at work.
The Role of Global Imbalances
While lax regulation and skewed incentives were at the heart of the crisis, some authors have placed equal emphasis on global imbalances. A first argument for the importance of global imbalances is that they lowered the required return on U.S. treasury securities and, by implication, on the residential-mortgage-backed securities and associated derivatives that were close substitutes. But empirical studies suggest that this effect was limited. The largest estimate of which I am aware, Warnock and Warnock (2009) , suggests that the impact on ten-year treasury yields was on the order of 90 basis points. Other estimates (e.g. Craine and Martin 2009) make the impact just half that. No question, lower yields encouraged investors to stretch for yield by moving into riskier assets. They encouraged portfolio managers to take on additional risk in order to meet historical benchmarks. But it is important to think about not only signs but magnitudes. In other words, it is hard to imagine that the financial crisis would have been fundamentally different had long-term rates in the United States been 50 or even 90 basis points higher while everything else remained the same.
Moreover, emphasizing the U.S. current account deficit (and corresponding foreign surpluses) reflects a focus on net capital flows, where gross flows were larger and growing more quickly. 10 If the concern is not with the level of U.S. interest rates but with flows of finance into toxic mortgage-related securities, then foreigners were fully capable of buying into this market (or into markets for other assets that were substitutes, like the U.S. treasury market, pushing 10 See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) . Whelan (2010) is good on this point.
other investors into mortgage-related securities) without running current account surpluses. In a world of international capital mobility, it was only necessary for U.S. investors to take equalsized positions in foreign markets. 11 In fact, barely a third of the increase in the gross external liabilities of the United States in 2002-7 can be explained in an accounting sense by the country's cumulative current account deficits. While current account imbalances and capital mobility are related, much of the literature implicating imbalances in the crisis unhelpfully emphasizes the former to the exclusion of the latter.
As good an indication as any of this is the fact that European banks were substantial enablers of the subprime crisis in the sense that they ended up holding large amounts of subprime-related structured credit products. Europe did not run a significant current account surplus with the United States. Two-way trade in assets, in conjunction with lapses in supervision and regulation, and not global imbalances explains this fact.
A subtler argument, made by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009) , is that global imbalances and the excesses resulting in the financial crisis were jointly determined by the stance of policy. In the early stages of the debate it was fashionable to indict U.S. fiscal policy and specifically the deterioration in the budget balance following enaction of the Bush tax cuts of 2001-2. Public dissaving meant national dissaving, widening the current account deficit. By artificially goosing the U.S. economy, the budget deficit goosed the housing market. But much subsequent literature questioned the link between fiscal policy and global imbalances; it challenged the "twin deficits hypothesis," showing that even if there was a link it was less than robust. 12 Similarly, while fiscal policy was part of the broad policy backdrop for the housing boom, it is hard to assign it a leading role. And while the fact of large pre-existing deficits limited the authorities' options when the crisis struck and raised questions about medium-term fiscal sustainability, this is different from saying that fiscal policy caused global imbalances and the crisis.
More recently, debate has focused on the role of monetary policy in the crisis. U.S.
monetary policy was too loose in 2003-4, it is alleged, when the Fed's discount rate was significantly below the levels suggested by the Taylor Rule. Global imbalances were not responsible for the Fed's decision to cut rates so sharply in 2001, but they enabled the U.S.
11 Or for foreign investors to sell other safer U.S. securities already in their possession.
12 A useful review of the literature is Bartolini and Lahiri (2006) . An update using data through 2009 is Chinn, Eichengreen and Ito (2010 between the rates on adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) keyed to the one-year interest rate and conventional 30-year mortgages nearly doubled -as did the share of new mortgage borrowers opting for ARMs. Again, however, the question is whether the impact on the housing market was substantial. Bernanke (2010) objects that, although the gap between rates on ARMs and conventional mortgages grew over time, it was never large. Greenspan (2010) observes that ARM originations peaked two years before the housing market, the implication being that they could not have been responsible for the bubble.
13 By inter alia Taylor (2007) .
None of this is to deny a role for global imbalances in the crisis. But it is to question whether the priority for policy, and specifically policy makers concerned to prevent renewed financial instability, should be to seek to prevent their recurrence. Why European banks should have been infected is no mystery. Feeling the intensification of competition (in their case owing to the Single Market rather than the elimination of GlassSteagall), they were even more highly leveraged than their U.S. counterparts and heavily invested in structured financial products. In some countries, Spain, Ireland, and the UK for example, they were also deeply implicated in local housing booms.
By comparison, it is less clear why trade should have collapsed so dramatically, faster even than output and faster than in the 1930s. The largest part of the explanation appears to be that a substantial fraction of trade was in parts and components related to the production of "postponeables" (big ticket items on which consumers and firms temporarily stopped spending when uncertainty spiked). 15 Disruptions to the availability of trade credit also mattered, but their effects were less persistent. Overt and murky protectionism thankfully made only a minor contribution to the slump in trade.
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By the summer of 2008, the world economy was tracking the Great Depression. In contrast to that earlier historical episode, the policy response was quick and powerful. That the advanced countries responded with aggressive monetary and fiscal easing is unsurprising; officials were acutely aware of the dangers of inaction (Wessel 2009 ), and they possessed policy room for maneuver. More striking is the quick and substantial reaction of emerging markets. In part this reflected the fact that there now existed, for the first time, venues like the Group of 20 to communicate the need for a coordinated response that avoided free riding and beggar-thy-14 I return to this below.
15 See Eaton, Kortum, Neiman and Romalis (2010) . The postponeables terminology is from Baldwin and Taglioni (2009 (Table 2) . By 2009, however, the stimulus applied by G20 emerging market members matched that of the United States, scaled by GDP. China's stimulus so measured was by far the greatest. It is worth reminding oneself in light of subsequent events that the fiscal stimulus applied by EU G20 members was relatively small all through the period.
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Some of these responses are easier to visualize when depicted in two dimensions. Figure   1 shows that the G20 countries experiencing the largest slowdowns did not always respond with largest stimuli. One reason, suggested by Figure 2 , is the wide variation within the G20 in the size of the public sectors government: countries with a larger share of tax-related revenues in GDP had more scope for ramping up public spending or cutting taxes. 18 Figure 5 shows, however, that the same countries that cut policy rates aggressively were not rewarded with lower long-term real interest rates. This is a reminder of the limited power of 17 Of course, large variations are hidden within the EU G20 average, and the G20 does not include such EU countries as Greece, Portugal and Ireland. Spain (Table 1) is another matter. 18 On the roots of these potential doctrinal differences, see below.
conventional monetary policy in a severe slump. In an environment of actual or expected inflation, central banks may be constrained by the zero bound on nominal rates, and policy rates operating on the short end of the term structure will influence the long-term rates on which, inter alia, investment decisions depend only insofar as they succeed in influencing expectations about future conditions and future policy (recall the Fed's "low for long" commitment).
Figure 6 can be read as suggesting that exchange rate adjustment played a positive role adjustment to the crisis. Real exchange rates depreciated between January 2008 and January 2010 in countries experiencing relatively large falls in output, crowding in exports, other things equal. Since inflation rates were not all that different, much of this adjustment was accomplished by changes in nominal rates. The case of the UK, which saw a sharp depreciation of sterling, is a case in point.
Re-Thinking the Response
With the passage of time, the exceptional stimulus measures widely credited with averting "Great Depression 2.0" do not come off as looking quite so positive. The resurgence of financial volatility in Europe in 2010 and contagion to other countries, together with drastic fiscal cuts auguring a sharp reduction in public-sector support for aggregate demand, suggest that policy makers simply kicked the can down the road. They averted a larger collapse in aggregate demand in 2007-9 only by laying the groundwork for a further collapse in 2010 once investors awoke to problems of debt sustainability, forcing fiscal retrenchment by now dangerously indebted governments. They socialized bad debts of the financial and nonfinancial sectors by taking them onto the public-balance sheet, transforming a problem of private debt sustainability into a problem of public debt sustainability but without resolving the underlying issues.
It is easy to be critical but hard, even with benefit of hindsight, to say what exactly should have been done differently. A first hypothesis is that governments should have been more aware of potential problems of debt sustainability and shown more restraint in applying fiscal stimulus. As a blanket statement this hypothesis is hard to accept. In the United States, there are no signs that the $787 billion stimulus was too large. It replaced at most a third of the private spending vaporized in the crisis. It was not enough to prevent unemployment rates from rising into the double digits. It showed no sign of raising immediate concerns about the sustainability of the public debt. There was no upward pressure on treasury yields: as the beginning of May 2010, ten-year yields were 3.14, down slightly from 3.17 a year before. There were no downgrades on U.S. sovereign debt from the rating agencies. 19 A number of other countries (China, Germany) were similarly in a position to provide considerable fiscal support for spending because they entered the crisis with their powder dry (with relatively low levels of debt).
A second hypothesis is that the fiscal response should have been more discriminating.
Countries that entered the crisis with heavy debt loads should have been more cautious before undertaking additional deficit spending. They should have recognized that they were apt to run up against problems of debt sustainability relatively quickly, because their inherited debts were heavy and also because the denominator of the debt/GDP ratio was now likely to grow more slowly due to the permanent damage done to their economies and financial systems. But in the heat of the battle everyone laid on massive fiscal stimulus, regardless of whether or not they were really in a position to do so.
Of course, to avoid weakening global growth, less deficit spending by heavily indebted countries should have been offset by more deficit spending by other countries in a better position to undertake it. The call for coordinated fiscal stimulus was taken up by the G20, whose communiqués regularly emphasized the case. But the size of national stimulus packages was, in the end, left to national authorities. Those communiqués said nothing about the desirability of countries with debt-sustainability issues doing less while their more lightly-indebted counterparts did more. And even had the national leaders assembled by the G20 acknowledged this point, one
can question whether where they led, legislatures would have followed. Would the U.S.
Congress have supported an even larger stimulus on the ground that the U.S. needed to do more because heavily indebted countries in Europe needed to do less? That domestic politics can be an obstacle to international policy coordination is a well-established point. 20 It would have been a significant obstacle in this context.
A third critique is that the fiscal authorities should have done more to detail their exit strategies. Explaining and, even better, credibly committing to timely exits would have encouraged private spending and reduced the magnitude of the demand shortfall that the fiscal authorities had to fill. Less deficit spending in the future would have meant lower interest rates 19 Yet. 20 See inter alia Frankel (1988). in the future, which, operating through the term structure, would have meant lower interest rates now, encouraging private spending. To be sure, insofar as interest rates were already near zero, this mechanism would have helped less than otherwise. But one can still imagine that credible plans for eliminating exceptional deficits would have bolstered private confidence and spending, permitting the fiscal authorities to do less.
A fourth critique is that governments did too little to restructure and recapitalize their banking systems, allowing sovereign and private debt problems to jeopardize the stability of financial systems. In Germany, banks' ratio of capital to assets remained just 5 per cent circa 2010, in contrast to 12 per cent in the United States. In Spain, the authorities were reluctant to openly acknowledge the need to shrink the number of cajas (regional savings banks) until fully two years into the crisis. In Ireland, panicked authorities extended a blanket guarantee on not just bank deposits but on all bank debt, effectively taking obligations to bank bondholders onto the public balance sheet. This created renewed difficulties when the guarantees approached their expiration date in 2010. 21 If we know one thing about banking crises, it is that the longer their resolution is put off, the more costly it becomes. 22 In all these cases, we see how delay in resolving banking problems and questions about fiscal sustainability fed on one another in a vicious spiral.
More generally, it can be argued that the mistake was not to move more quickly to write down bad debts. In some countries (Portugal, the U.S., Spain) the problem of debt overhang was associated not so much with public as private debts. Nonviable real estate loans and their corporate equivalents should have been restructured more quickly, the argument goes. This would have reduced both uncertainty and the depressing effects of debt deflation. The problem was that mass restructuring was easier said than done. The bankruptcy courts would have been swamped. Where loans were securities, restructuring was more complex, and often the loan servicer had little incentive to facilitate the process. Restructuring bad loans would have forced banks to realize additional losses, which would have required additional expensive recapitalization. Voting publics objected to proposals for selective relief, which would have 21 Only subordinated debt remained unguaranteed. The authorities might have opted for less expensive measures, such as guarantees for new lending or the early injection of preference or ordinary shares; in the event this was not done. See Honohan (2009) for discussion. 22 See Laeven and Valencia (2008) .
written down the mortgages of homeowners under water but not benefitted their neighbors who had bought smaller houses and taken out smaller loans, while schemes for across-the-board relief would have been prohibitively costly. All this encouraged forbearance rather than the recognition of losses. A social planner might have done things differently, but that was not the political reality.
A final critique is that countries should have relied more on monetary easing and less on fiscal easing. Had central banks done more to support aggregate demand, especially in Europe, it would have been possible for governments to do less. Where the monetary authorities pulled out all the stops, as in the U.S. and UK, pursuing unconventional policies and engaging in quantitative easing, it is hard to imagine how they could have done more. But the ECB was reluctant to push interest rates to near zero (a precondition for turning to quantitative easing),
arguing that it needed to keep interest rates in positive territory so that it had room to reduce them if conditions deteriorated still further. It was reluctant to engage in direct purchases of government bonds, given that this would entail, more likely than not, purchasing the bonds of the most heavily indebted governments with the least liquid markets, exposing the central bank to accusations of favoritism and cultivating moral hazard. 23 More than anything, it was reluctant to initiate and defend a policy that could be seen as printing money and thereby exciting German fears of inflation.
Given subsequent problems, and the fact that the ECB was forced to turn to direct government bond purchases anyway, it is hard to argue with the conclusion that it would have been better for Europe, already in 2009, to rely less on fiscal stimulus and more on aggressive 
Some Conclusions
As in the case of the Asian crisis of 1997-8, we will be debating the causes and consequences of the 2007-10 advanced-country financial crisis for years. Evaluations will continue to evolve along with events, no doubt, but it is not too early to begin drawing some provisional conclusions.
First, while this crisis, like all crises, had multiple causes, at its center were problems of lax supervision and regulation. It is appropriate therefore that post-crisis efforts, both in the United States and at the level of the G20, should focus on regulatory reform. Unfortunately, accomplishments here are less than meet the eye. In the U.S., nothing has been done to downsize big banks. 25 The role of the credit rating agencies in regulatory decision making has not been eliminated. It will still be possible for the banks to trade bespoke credit default swaps over the counter. Other than abolishing the Office of Thrift Supervision, nothing has been done to consolidate the fragmented process of supervisory oversight. Macro-prudential supervision will be by committee, which sounds suspiciously like no macro-prudential supervision at all.
The new financial consumer protection agency is in limbo: in the Fed but not of the Fed.
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At the level of the G20, there is still no agreement on what should be the priority: a bank tax, an executive compensation tax, new restrictions on hedge funds and private equity funds, or a ban on short selling. While there has been much discussion of further reforms of the Basel II framework, there has been no progress in implementation. The crisis in Europe hardly creates 25 The recently passed Dodd-Frank bill contains a provision limiting individual banks' assets to 10 per cent of total financial assets, but this is unlikely to affect even the largest financial institutions (except possibly Bank of America). 26 It has been placed in the Fed mainly in order to avoid any direct budgetary implications of its operation. Moreover, a committee of bank regulators will have the power to veto any decision taken by the new agency as damaging to the banks.
confidence that there will be early progress; the weak condition of their banks has caused Germany and France to suggest waiting as long as ten years before fully putting the new rules into effect. 27 Efforts at constructing a proper resolution regime for systemically significant financial firms at the global level have barely begun. This may be too negative an assessment at progress in strengthening supervision and regulation. But it is hard to contain one's disappointment that more was not done in the wake of the most serious global financial crisis in 80 years.
Second, the crisis is a reminder of the value of keeping one's fiscal powder dry. Too many of the advanced countries entered the crisis with large budget deficits and elevated debts.
An unprecedented crisis may have justified an unprecedented fiscal response, but against a backdrop of fiscal profligacy it also created unprecedented problems of debt sustainability.
Emerging markets learned from the crises of the 1990s the importance of running budget surpluses and keeping fiscal capacity in reserve. Note: All G20 countries for which data are available. The UK as an outlier is excluded when the least squares regression line is calculated. Note: All G20 countries for which data are available. UK as outlier is excluded when least squares regression line is calculated. Note: All G20 countries for which data are available. UK as outlier is excluded when least squares regression line is calculated. Note: all G20 countries for which data are available. Russia and Mexico as outliers are excluded when the least squares regression line is calculated. Note: all G20 countries for which data are available. Russia as an outlier is excluded when the least squares regression line is calculated.
